

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY**

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Office Hrs: Thrs. 2:00-3:00pm; OBA

INTA 6103  
Spring 2014  
Tues. 6:00-9:00pm  
Habersham G-17

### ***OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION***

This course examines issues connected with the threat or use of force in international relations. The objectives are to introduce and critique the main theories of international conflict, and to discuss specific threats. This course does not focus on in-depth historical study of discrete events or U.S. national security policies, *per se*. Rather, primary emphasis is placed on analyzing these issues systematically to uncover the implicit assumptions and logic behind decisions to threaten or to use force, and to tie these assessments to real-world concerns and contemporary policy debates. By the end of the semester students will be able to review and critique alternative explanations for conflict/war and the respective policies adopted to address foreign threats by different actors in the international system. In addition, students will be able to use such critical analysis to generate concrete policy recommendations on related issues.

To explore international security, we analyze key theories of international conflict, as well as discuss contemporary threats to international security and policy options to redress these threats. The first part of the course introduces and examines traditional theories of war, strategy, and conflict. Special attention is devoted to analyzing specific theoretical debates over the causes of war located at each level of analysis in the study of international relations. The second part of the course examines burning functional security issues of the day from these divergent scholarly perspectives. The third part assesses these alternative theoretical explanations for conflict as they relate to contemporary policy problems. This part of the course includes several policy simulations that are run along the lines of the U.S. National Security Council, with students assuming the role of key bureaucratic players and interest groups and actively engaging in critical policy deliberations on designated issues. The course concludes with discussion of general approaches to promoting international security and preventing disruption to the system.

**REQUIRED READING**

Michael Brown, Owen Cote Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds. *Offense, Defense, and War* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004);

Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds. *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999);

Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003);

Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, *The Political Economy of Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005);

Catherine Kelleher and Judith Reppy, *Getting to Zero* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011);

T.V. Paul, Patrick Morgan, and James Wirtz, eds. *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age* (University of Chicago press, 2009).

Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner, *Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

Photocopied Readings. Copies will be made available to you either in hardcopy or in electronic form via JSTOR or EBSCOHOST. Both can be accessed via the Georgia Tech Library web page by (1) clicking on “databases,” (2) selecting JSTOR or EBSCO HOST (Academic Universe) in the second dialogue box, (3) “entering” JSTOR, and (4) searching for article by author or title.

**FORMAT**

This course is run as a graduate seminar. My role is confined to providing an overview of the literature and debates for each week’s reading, and to facilitating group deliberation of respective theoretical and policy debates. The success of the course, therefore, depends on the level of preparedness and engagement by each student. Consequently, each student is expected to attend every class and to participate actively in all in-class discussions and role-playing exercises. Students must complete all required reading before the start of each class; come prepared for each session by posing questions, offering insights, critically engaging each other, and reading and reviewing each other’s work; and consult with me outside of class as necessary.

## ***REQUIREMENTS***

**First**, as mentioned above, it is mandatory that each student attends and participates actively in each class. Silence is not an option, as students are expected to engage each other in analyzing the reading and arguments presented in class. In order to stimulate discussion, each student is required to submit a one-page brief that reflects critical thinking about a reading for a respective week (excluding policy deliberations). This brief must succinctly summarize the main issues of **a single** debate captured by the week's reading, and raise both an analytical and empirical question for further discussion. Each student is responsible for acquiring empirical knowledge of relevant historical or contemporary cases of her/his choosing to inform the points raised for discussion. The brief is due no later than noon on the Thursday that we will discuss the topic. The purpose of this assignment is for students to become immersed in the subject matter, actively engaged by the reading, and prepared to contribute constructively to class discussion. Although each student is free to select week to write this brief, the assignment must be completed by **March 11<sup>th</sup>**.

**Second**, each student is required to deliver one presentation with an accompanying write-up during one of the substantive classes through **March 11<sup>th</sup>**. Each student must sign up for a week in which she/he is particularly interested in the topic, complete the reading for the week, and present a critical synthesis to draw analytical links and fill gaps in a specific debate in the literature. Each student must draft a 5-page paper that: concisely summarizes the arguments presented by the different authors engaged in a debate; discusses the logical (in)consistencies of these arguments; presents empirical evidence to contradict a theory or set of arguments; and uncovers the practical implications of this analysis. These write-ups must be turned in no later than noon on the day that the class will discuss the topic. That evening in class, the author of the write-up will *succinctly* present her/his findings: introducing the debate, elaborating on several analytical points, discussing specific cases, teasing out policy implications, and raising questions to extend the debate. Each formal presentation should take **no more than 20 minutes** and must be accompanied by a visual aid (PowerPoint). Write-ups and presentations are to serve as the springboard for further discussion and analysis by the rest of the class. Therefore, these assignments should be well conceived and should contain relevant information that is well organized and articulated. Please note, the topics/week's readings for this assignment cannot be the same as those selected for the Brief.

**Third**, each student is required to write one 5-7 page review essay that assesses and critiques a set of readings reviewed (excluding weeks of policy deliberations). The essays have to be handed in at the beginning of the class period during which the respective readings are to be discussed. Please note that your task is not to write a book review. Rather, the objectives are: (1) to analyze critically the assumptions (implicit and/or explicit), logical consistency, methodology, and use of empirical evidence in at least two readings of a debate; and (2) to critique the policy relevance of the core hypotheses/arguments. Students should not select the same topic covered in their briefs or presentations unless cleared by me.

**Fourth**, each student is required to participate as a group member during *three* policy deliberations. These sessions will be run like a meeting of the U.S. National Security Council, with student groups representing different government players in the policymaking process. For each session, a scenario will be presented with specific issues to be addressed by the class. Each group will draft a 5-7 page policy brief that outlines the key issues of debate, analytical considerations, options, and policy recommendations. This analysis will reflect the group's strategic and organizational interests in the policymaking process. In class, each group will present its findings and explain the analytical and empirical bases for its recommendations; critique/challenge the findings presented by other groups; and work with other groups to fashion a coherent/unified strategy. Group positions will rotate for each session. Each student also will submit a one-page peer review of her/his group at the end of the third exercise. Logistical and substantive issues/scenarios TBA.

**Finally**, each student is required to write a policy memo (10-12 pages) to address a contemporary international security issue of her/his choosing. Each memo will assess two or more theories and attendant policy prescriptions that bear on a specific debate. Students are expected to analyze critically the theoretical and practical merits of each theory and policy option, develop their own original thesis in reaction to the arguments under review, and derive logically consistent and empirically grounded policy recommendations. The objective of this assignment is to get students to appreciate the importance of both critical assessment and policy analysis for systematically understanding and coping with contemporary international security issues. Policy memos cannot be on issues covered by a student's oral presentation and write-up. Policy memos are due by 5pm on **April 29<sup>th</sup>**.

### ***GRADING***

Class Participation	10%
Brief	5%
Class Presentation and Write-up	15%
Critical Review Essay	20%
Group Policy Position Papers	15%
Final Policy Memo	35%

## *COURSE SCHEDULE*

### **PART I: THEORIES OF WAR AND CONFLICT**

**Jan. 7: Introduction**

**Jan. 14: Security Dilemma: The Offense-Defense Balance**

Michael Brown et. al., *Offense, Defense, and War*, PART I (Entire), PART II (Van Evera, Snyder, Shimshoni); PART III (Van Evera, Correspondence, Betts).

Jack Levy, "The Offense/Defense Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (1984), pp. 219-238. (Ebscohost).

Keir A. Lieber, *War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), Chp. 5. (T-square).

\*Evan Braden Montgomery, "Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma," *International Security* 31:2 (Fall 2006), pp. 151-185 (Library: e-journals)

\*Brown et. al., *Offense, Defense, and War* (Lieber, Adams).

**\*Recommended**

Cases: Crimean War, World Wars I & II.

**Jan. 21: The Absolute Weapon and Deterrence**

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 92-125. (T-square).

T.V. Paul, et. al. *Complex Deterrence*, Chps. 2, 4, 6, 7, 9 11, 12.

Commentary, "The Case for No First Use: An Exchange," *Survival* 51:5 (2009)

[http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/the\\_case\\_for\\_no\\_first\\_use\\_an\\_exchange/](http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/the_case_for_no_first_use_an_exchange/)

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl Press, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2006), [www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85204/keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-u-s-nuclear-primacy.html](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85204/keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-u-s-nuclear-primacy.html)

Kelleher and Reppy, eds. *Getting to Zero* (chps. 1, 3, 4, (peruse 5-8); 14 or 15, (peruse 16-17, 18, 19).

Charles Glaser, "The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament," *Survival* 40 (Spring 1998), pp. 112-128. (EbscoHost).

George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn (4 Principals) series of op. eds., "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," <http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/about/principals>

John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 13:2 (Fall 1988), pp. 55-79. (Library: e-journals).

\*John Mueller, *Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), Part 1

\*Scott D. Sagan, "The Commitment Trap," *International Security* 24:4 (Spring 2000), pp. 85-115. (EbscoHost).

\*Joseph Cirincione and Alexandra Bell, "The Eliminators," Center for American Progress (17 January 2008), [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/the\\_elimigators.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/the_elimigators.html)

\*Jonathan Schell, "The Gift of Time," *Nation*, 1998. Peruse.

\*Lyle J. Goldstein, "Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter? The Sino-Soviet Crisis of 1969," *Political Science Quarterly* 118:1 (2003), pp. 53-79.

\*Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The End of MAD?" *International Security* 30:3 (Spring 2006), pp. 7-44.

\*Documentary film, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy: A Video History, 1945-2004" <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb361/index.htm>

Cases: Korean War, Cuban Missile Crisis, Kashmir Conflicts, Yom Kippur War, Persian Gulf Wars, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, SDI/TMD, START; Virtual Nuclear Arsenals.

**Jan. 28: Coercion and the RMA**

T.V. Paul, et. al., eds., *Complex Deterrence*, Chp. 13.

Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge: The Nature of Power," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1996);  
<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0996/ijge/gjcom6.htm>.

John Arquilla, "The New Rules of War," *Foreign Policy* 78 (March/April 2010),  
[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/the\\_new\\_rules\\_of\\_war](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/the_new_rules_of_war).

Stephen Biddle, "Speed Kills: Reassessing the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of Saddam," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30:1 (Feb. 2007), pp. 3-46. (Library: e-journals);

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Cyber War is Coming," in Arquilla and Ronfeldt, eds., *In Athena's Camp* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997);  
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR880/MR880.ch2.pdf>.

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69-91. (T-square).

Robert Pape, "Coercive Air Power in Vietnam," *International Security* 15:2 (Fall 1990), pp. 103-146. (JSTOR).

Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate," *International Security* 24:4 (Spring 2000), pp. 5-38. (Ebscohost).

Peter Feaver, "Information Warfare and the Dynamics of Coercion," *Security Studies* 7:4 (Summer 1998), pp. 88-120. (JSTOR).

Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 8-41. (T-square).

P.W. Singer, "Wired for War?": Robots and Military Doctrine," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 52:1 (2009), pp. 104-110 (Ebscohost).

J. Clay Moltz, "Restraint Regimes for Space: A United States Perspective," UNDIR, [www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2382.pdf](http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2382.pdf)

\*Andrew L. Stigler, "A Clear Victory for Airpower: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo," *International Security* 27:3 (Winter 2002).

\*Daryl G. Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare," *International Security* 26:2 (Fall 2001), pp. 5-44.

\*John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy* (Santa Monica, RAND, 2001); Chp. 1; <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/>.

\*Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare?" *Foreign Affairs* 75 (March/April 1996), pp. 37-54.  
<http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/overview.html>

Cases: Israel-Syria Air War, Persian Gulf Wars, Kosovo, Libya

#### **Feb. 4: Democratic Peace and Diversionary Theory of War**

Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds. *Debating the Democratic Peace*, peruse entire book (read esp. Doyle; Layne, Farber & Gowa, Mansfield & Snyder, and PART 3).

David P. Auerswald, "Inward Bound: Domestic Institutions and Military Conflict," *International Organization* (Summer 1999), pp. 469-504. (Ebscohost).

James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *International Organization* 88:3 (Sept. 1994), pp. 577-592. (Ebscohost).

Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization* 62:1 (January 2008), pp. 65-101. (Ebscohost).

Chaim Kaufman, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security* 29:1 (Summer 2004), pp. 5-48. (Ebscohost).

Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, "Understanding Victory: Why Political Institutions Matter," *International Security* 28:1 (Summer 2003), pp. 168-179. (EbscoHost).

Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq," *International Security* 30:3 (Winter 2005/6), pp. 7-46. (EbscoHost).

Alexander B. Downes, "Restraint or Propellant?: Democracy and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51:6 (December 2007), pp. 872-904. (T-square).

\*Jack Levy, "Coercive Threats, Audience Costs, and Case Studies," *Security Studies* 21:3 (2012), pp. 383-390.

\*Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), Chp. 3. (Reserve).

\*Michael C. Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Fair Fights or Food Fights," *International Security* 28:1 (Summer 2003), pp. 180-194. (Ebscohost)

\*Dana H. Allin, Philp H. Gordon, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "The Democratic Party and Foreign Policy," *World Policy Journal* 20:1 (Spring 2003), <http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/wpj03-1.html>.

\*Kenneth Schultz and Barry Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: The Institutional Sources of State Power in International Competition," *International Organization* 57 (Winter 2003): 3-42.

Cases: Fashoda Crisis, Pre-WWI, Grenada, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Iraq, Lebanon, PLA, Arab Spring, Libya

## **Feb. 11: Is Rational Self-Interest Enough?**

Stephen Peter Rosen, *War and Human Nature* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 99-134. (T-square).

Elizabeth Saunders, "Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy," *International Security* 34:2 (Fall 2009), pp. 119-161 (Ebscohost).

Victor Cha and David Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, Chap. 1.

T.V. Paul, et. al., *Complex Deterrence*, Chps. 3 & 10 (peruse).

Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-1991," *International Security* (1992). (JSTOR).

Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," *International Security* 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93. (JSTOR).

Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 1-24. (T-square).

Jarrold Hayes, "Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran's Nuclear Programs," *International Studies Quarterly* 53:4 (2009), pp. 977-999. (Ebscohost).

Ron Hassner "To Halve and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility," *Security Studies* 12:4 (Summer 2003), pp.1-33. (Ebscohost).

Michael C. Horowitz, "Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading," *International Security* 34:2 (2009), pp. 162-193 (Ebscohost).

Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," *International Organization* 53:3 (1999), PP 433-468. (JSTOR).

Christopher Gelpi, *The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), Chp. 6. (T-square).

Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), Chp. 8. (T-square).

Colin H. Kahl, "In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs: Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in Iraq?" *International Security* 32:1 (Summer 2007).

[http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/869/in\\_the\\_crossfire\\_or\\_the\\_crosshairs.html](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/869/in_the_crossfire_or_the_crosshairs.html)

Richard C. Eichenberg, "Gender Differences in Public Attitudes Towards the Use of Force by the U.S.," *International Security* 28:1 (Summer 2003),pp. 110-141. (EbscoHost).

\*Ward Thomas, "Norms and Security," *International Security* 25:1 (Summer 2000), pp. 105-133. (Ebscohost).

\*Ward Wilson, "The Gordian Knot: Moral Debate and Nuclear Weapons," *Ethics and International Affairs* 27:3 (2013). (Library: online journals)

\*Daryl Press, Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino, "Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons," Working Draft (November 2011)

<http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2011/11/17/americans-dont-think-that-using-nuclear-weapons-is-a-taboo/>

\*Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics* (1987). (JSTOR).

\*Kevin Woods, James Lacy, and Williamson Murray, Saddam's Delusions: A View from the Inside," *Foreign Affairs* 85 (May/June 2006), 2-26.

\*Andrew Flibbert, "The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 15:2 (April-June 2006), pp. 310-352.

\*Jack S. Levy, "Misperceptions and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems," *International Organization* 36:1 (October 1983), pp. 76-99.

\*Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," *International Security* 18:4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142.

Cases: World Wars I & II, Cold War, Afghanistan, Middle East, Vietnam, Iraq,

**Feb. 18: Nuclear Proliferation: Why Should We Care and What Can We Do?**

Victor Cha and David Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, Chaps. 2-4.

Peter R. Lavoy, "The Kenneth Waltz-Scott Sagan Debate: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Good or Bad?" *Security Studies* 44 (Summer 1995), pp. 695-753. (T-square).

T.V. Paul, et. al., eds, *Complex Deterrence*, Chp. 8.

David Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," *International Security* (1996/97). (Ebscohost).

*Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53:2 (April 2009), peruse all articles. (Ebscohost).

Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba, "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," *International Security* 29:2 (Fall 2004), pp. 5-49. (Ebscohost);

Jacques E.C. Hymans, Threat Perception of Nuclear Proliferation: Perception and Reality,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 27:3 (Fall 2013). (T-square).

Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), Chp. 12. (T-square).

John Mueller, *Atomic Obsession*, Chp. 10. (T-Square).

T.V. Paul, *The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Chp. 6. (T-Square).

Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” *International Security*, 34:3 (Winter 2010), pp. 38-78. (Ebscohost).

\*William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Diving Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay,” *International Security* 33:1 (Summer 2008). (Ebscohost).

\*Derek K. Smith, “Deterrence and Counterproliferation in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *Security Studies*, 12:4 (Summer 2003), pp. 152-197. (Reserve).

\*John Mueller, *Atomic Obsession*, Chps. 6-9, 11 (peruse).

\*Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” *Foreign Affairs* (1998). (Ebscohost).

\*David Albright and Khidhir Hamza, “Iraq’s Reconstitution of Its Nuclear Weapons Program,” *Arms Control Today* (Oct 1998); (<http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/oct98/daoc98.htm> or [www.isis-online.org/toc.html](http://www.isis-online.org/toc.html)).

\*Jacques E.C. Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*, Chp. 3. (T-square).

\*Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics* (New York: Princeton University Press, 2007).

\*Peter Feaver and Emerson Nio, “Managing Nuclear Proliferation,” *International Studies Quarterly* (1996).

\*Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” *International Security* (Winter 1992/93). (Ebscohost).

Cases: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, NIS, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Japan, Germany, Sweden

**Feb. 25: Ethnic/Civil Conflict and Migration**

James Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97 (February 2003): 75-90. (JSTOR).

Alexander B. Downes, "Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves," *Civil Wars* 9:4 (December 2007), pp. 420-444. (T-square).

Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security* 21:2 (Autumn 1996), 5-40. (JSTOR).

Jayshree Bajoria, "The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention," CFR Backgrounder (24 March 2011), <http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention/p16524>.

Jason Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?: Evidence from Chechnya," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53:3 (June 2009), pp. 331-362. (T-square)

John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'" *International Security* 25:1 (Summer 2000), pp. 42-70. (T-square).

Benjamin A. Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), pp. 66-90. (T-square).

Monica Duffy Toft, *Religion, Civil War, and International Order* (Harvard/BCSIA Discussion Paper No. 2006-03: July 2006); [http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=ISP&ctype=paper&item\\_id=540](http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=ISP&ctype=paper&item_id=540).

Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Chp. 6. (T-square).

Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* (1993). (T-square).

David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security* 21:2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75. (Ebscohost).

Monica Duffy Toft, "Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War," *Security Studies*, 12:2 (Winter 2002/3), pp. 82-119. (EbscoHost).

Doyle McManus, "Obama Flirts with a Doctrine," *LA Times*, 31 March 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/31/opinion/la-oe-mcmanus-column-obama-doctrine-20110331>.

Chaim Kaufman, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Civil Wars," *International Security* 20:4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175. (Ebscohost).

Nicholas Sambanis, *Ethnic Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature* (September 18, 1999. (T-square)).

Colin H. Kahl, *States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chp. 4. (T-square)).

\*S.A. Arutiunov, "Ethnicity in the Caucasus: Ethnic Relations and Quasi-Ethnic Conflicts," *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict Unpublished Manuscript* (1999).  
<http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/ethnic/ethifr.htm>

\*F. Stephen Larrabee, "Down and Out in Warsaw and Budapest," in Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller, eds. *Global Dangers*.

\*Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, *Sustainable Peace*, pp. 109-132 (Lake and Rothchild chapter).

\*Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*, Chp. 3.

\* Erica Chenoweth and Adria Lawrence, eds., *Rethinking Violence* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010), remainder.

Cases: Syria, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, NIS, Rwanda, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, Arab Spring, North Korea

#### **March 4: Globalization, Commerce, and Security**

Peter Liberman, "Trading With the Enemy," *International Security* 21:1 (Summer 1996). (Ebscohost).

Aysegul Aydin, "Choosing Sides: Economic Interdependence and Interstate Disputes," *Journal of Politics* 70 (2008): 1098-1108. (Ebscohost).

Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War," *International Security* 20:4 (Spring 1996). (Ebscohost).

Jonathan Kirshner, "Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art," *Security Studies* 9: 1/2 (Summer 2002), pp. 160-179. (Ebscohost).

Miles Kahler and Scott Kastner, "Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait," *Journal of Peace Research* 43:5 (2006), pp. 523-541. (Ebscohost).

William J. Long, "Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation," *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (1996). (JSTOR/Ebscohost).

Stephen Brooks, *Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), Chp. 4. (T-square).

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**March 25: No Class: PM Deliberation**

**April 1: Nuclear Crisis Management & Iran: Policy Deliberation #1**

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**April 15: International Intervention and Peacekeeping (Yemen, Syria, or TBA): Policy Deliberation 3**

Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), Chp. 5. (T-square).

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**May 1: Final Policy Memos Due at 5pm**