

## **INTA 6103**

### **International Security**

Georgia Institute of Technology  
Fall 2023

#### **Course Information**

Friday 2:00 - 4:45 p.m.  
Room: Habersham G17

#### **Contact Information**

##### **Professor Dalton Lin**

Office: Habersham 219

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Office Hours: Wednesday 2:00 – 4:00 pm. Please use [Book time with Dalton Lin: Office Hours](#) to make appointments.

#### **Course Description**

This seminar discusses a selected list of critical concepts in international security studies. It begins with a discussion of the concept of “anarchy” and the assumptions and propositions of structural realism to lay the foundation. It then introduces key international security concepts, including the security dilemma, balance of power, offense-defense balance, alliance politics, deterrence, brinkmanship, the first strike advantage, private information, the commitment problem, and the audience cost. The course aims to empower students with these conceptual tools to understand and explain contemporary international security issues. For that purpose, the course uses the cases of China’s rise, the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait tensions, the Ukraine War, the gray-zone operations in the South China Sea, and the weaponization of cyber and space for class discussion.

Due to time limitations, this course predominantly focuses on state-centric, realist discussions of international security. Notably, it does not touch upon constructivist and feminist perspectives on international security issues and only introduce liberalist arguments briefly. However, the omission does not imply their insignificance. In addition, this course does not cover several prominent international security topics, including nuclear weapons, other

weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. Students interested in these topics are encouraged to check out INTA courses offered by Dr. Rachel Whitlark, Dr. Margaret Kosal, Dr. Jenna Jordan, and Dr. Lawrence Rubin.

### **Course Requirements**

Students are expected to complete the assigned readings and proactively participate in seminar discussions and class activities.

### ***Required Reading***

The following books are required for the course:

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966)

Thomas Christensen, *Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia* (Princeton University Press, 2011)

Other readings are available through the Georgia Tech Library online resources or on Canvas when the library does not provide access.

I also encourage students to follow contemporary international security issues by reading international news. Sources of good international coverage include but are not limited to the *New York Times*, *BBC* (<https://www.bbc.com/news>), *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Financial Times*, and the *Economist*. Registering through the GT Library's Databases allows you free access to the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and the *Financial Times*. The *BBC* is not behind a paywall. In addition, listening to NPR news (<https://www.npr.org>) is a good alternative.

### ***Requirements and Evaluation***

Students enrolled in this seminar have the following responsibilities:

1. Submit discussion questions for each topic.
  - Discussion questions are due by **Thursday's 2 p.m. on Canvas**.
  - I don't expect more than one or two thoughtful questions, which may or may not be accompanied by a short explanation. For example, think of these as the **discussion questions or comments** you might offer at a panel where these papers were being presented. Think of inconsistencies across readings (or within

them). Think of substance and method and what is being explained. Think too of the security issue you want to write for your policy memo (details later) and how the work helps or doesn't help.

2. Lead one seminar discussion.
  - You will sign up to lead a discussion. To prepare for leading the discussion, review your and your classmates' discussion questions and group them into a few big inquiries or debates.
  - There might be multiple people leading the same discussion, so coordinate within the group to develop a discussion plan. Then, on **the Friday** that you will lead the discussion, meet with me **at 1:00 pm** to go through your discussion plan.
3. Actively participate in seminar discussions.
4. Submit a policy memo.
  - Each student will write a policy memo (4 pages maximal, single-spaced, 12-pt font, 1 inch margin) on a contemporary case study or security topic of her/his choosing. Each memo will be addressed to a client—a head of a government agency or international institution, or a policy strategist at a firm or NGO—and will briefly summarize the significance of the event or issue, critically evaluate the interests at stake for the client, outline policy options, and explain how to choose among them. The final paper will be due on **December 8th at 11:59 pm**.
  - I will explain the format and substance of the policy memo on **November 10<sup>th</sup>**.
5. Actively participate in in-class policy simulation (details in the following).

## Simulation

Each student will participate in a dynamic course policy simulation that will take place during the November 17th and December 1st class periods. The specific scenario and format of the simulation will be discussed in class. Each student is required to write several short preliminary concept papers and a group scenario. Those students who will participate in the role of **Control** will individually write two concept papers (3-5 pages each, double spaced). The **first** will specify and explain prevailing conditions that constrain options and behavior among contending actors, as well as assess alternative driving forces that motivate the behavior of contending actors. The **second** paper will identify critical uncertainties that can alter constraints, motivations, and/or behavior. Both papers are due no later than **October 27th**. All Control members will then collectively draft a **specific scenario** around the issue for distribution to the class on **November 10th**.

Alternatively, those students who participate as country team members will be required to individually write a short background paper (3-4 pages, double-spaced) and contribute to

drafting a group policy position paper (7 pages, double-spaced). For the **first** background paper, each student will summarize the policy issues at stake from the respective national perspective. The **second** paper will be collectively written by respective national teams, laying out the initial policy positions and objectives for the designated scenario. Both papers will be due at the onset of the simulation on **November 17th**. Each student will participate actively in all group problem-solving and deliberative exercises during the two-day policy simulation.

Grades will be determined as follows:

- Discussion questions (10%)
- Discussion leadership (10%)
- Class participation (25%)
- Concept, background, and position papers (20%; 10% each)
- Simulation/script (control), and simulation participation (country teams) (10%)
- Policy memo (25%)

### **Course Procedures**

**Announcements:** Important information about the course will be announced through Canvas. I encourage students to set up receiving notifications from Canvas to avoid missing critical communication (Go to Canvas, then Account, then Notifications, and check Announcement)

**Office Hours:** I will hold office hours each week. Please use [Book time with Dalton Lin: Office Hours](#) to make appointments. Feel free to email me to set up appointments if the assigned office hours do not accommodate your schedule.

**Grade Disputes:** Any student may request a grade reevaluation by the professor. The student must accept the revised grade, which may be lower, higher, or the same as the original grade.

**Cheating and Plagiarism:** Cheating and plagiarism are serious offenses and directly violate the Georgia Tech Academic Honor Code. Plagiarizing is defined by Webster's as "to steal and pass off (the ideas or words of another) as one's own: use (another's production) without crediting the source." If caught cheating or plagiarizing, you will be dealt with according to the GT Academic Honor Code. For any questions involving these or any other Academic Honor Code issues, please consult the professor or [www.honor.gatech.edu](http://www.honor.gatech.edu).

This course is offered by the Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts. The Ivan Allen College supports the Georgia Institute of Technology's commitment to creating a campus free of discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, or veteran status. We further affirm the importance of cultivating an intellectual climate that allows us to better understand the similarities and differences of those who constitute the Georgia Tech community, as well as the necessity of working against

inequalities that may also manifest here as they do in the broader society. If you have any concerns about inclusive diversity in this course, please don't hesitate to raise them to the instructor.

**Learning Outcomes:**

1. Students will be able to apply knowledge of theories of international relations and apply them in analyzing events and outcomes in world affairs.
2. Students will be able to demonstrate knowledge of principal contemporary global challenges in the fields of international security.

**\*\*\*Note: Syllabus subject to change\*\*\***

## Schedule

August 25: Introduction

September 1: Anarchy and the Origins of International Security Issues

- Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 139-165.
- Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1979), Chapter 5: Political Structures.
- Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1991), pp. 67-85.
- David C. Kang, "Hierarchy in Asian International Relations: 1300-1900," *Asian Security*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2005), pp. 53-79.

*Mini lecture on structural realism:*

- Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* Vol. 18, No. 4 (1988), pp. 615-628.
- John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), Chapter 2.
- Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," *International Organization* Vol. 51, No. 3 (1997), pp. 445-477.
- John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 95, No. 4 (July/August 2016), pp. 70-83.

*For further reading:*

- Victoria Tin-bor Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe," *International Organization* Vol. 58, No. 1 (2004), pp. 175-205.

September 8: The Security Dilemma

- Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978), pp. 167-186.
- Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis," *Security Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2009), pp. 587-623.

- David A. Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics." *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2007), pp. 47-79.
- Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, "Racing Toward Tragedy? China's Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma," *International Security* Vol. 39, No. 2 (2014), pp. 52-91.

*For further reading:*

- Randall Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies* Vol. 5, No. 3 (1996), pp. 90-121.
- Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," *European Journal International Relations* Vol. 12, No. 3 (2006), pp. 341-370.

September 15: Balance of Power, Offense-Defense Balance, and Alliance

- Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1979), Chapter 6: Anarchic Orders and Balance of Power.
- Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* Vol. 9, no. 4 (1985), pp. 3-43.
- Keir Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," *International Security* Vol. 25, No. 1 (2000), pp. 71-104.
- Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* Vol. 19, No. 1 (1994), pp. 72-107.
- Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, "Chapter 11: Conclusion," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power* (Routledge, 1999), pp. 273-295.

*For further reading:*

- Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" *International Security* Vol. 22, No. 4 (1998), pp. 44-82.

September 22: Deterrence

- Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966), Chapter 2 The Art of Commitment, pp. 35-91.
- Robert Jervis, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary," in Jervis *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Chapter 3.

- Keren Yarhi-Milo, “In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries,” *International Security* Vol. 38, No. 1 (2013), pp. 7-51.

*Discussion: U.S. Security Commitment to Taiwan*

- Richard Haass and David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous,” *Foreign Affairs*, September 2, 2020. Canvas.
- Bonnie S. Glaswer; Michael J. Mazarr; Michael J. Glennon; Richard Hass and David Sacks, “Dire Straits,” *Foreign Affairs*, September 24, 2020. Canvas.

For the background of the issue:

- Adam P. Liff and Dalton Lin, “[The ‘One China’ Framework at 50 \(1972–2022\): The Myth of ‘Consensus’ and Its Evolving Policy Significance](#),” *The China Quarterly* Vol. 252, pp. 977-1000.

September 29: Security Dilemma, Alliance Politics, and Deterrence

- Glenn H Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” *World Politics* Vol. 36, No. 4 (1984): 461-495.
- Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1990), pp. 137-168.
- Thomas Christensen, *Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia* (Princeton University Press, 2011), Chapter 1, 2, and 3.

*For further reading:*

- Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” *International Security* Vol. 34, No. 3 (2009/2010), pp. 158-196.
- Tongfi Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States,” *Security Studies* Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 350-377.

October 6: Brinkmanship and Gray-Zone Operations

- Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Chapter 3 The Manipulation of Risk, pp. 92-125.
- Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson, “War without Gun Smoke: China’s Paranaul Challenge in the Maritime Gray Zone,” in Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson (eds.), *China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019). Canvas.
- Bonnie Glaser and Matthew Funaiolo, “South China Sea: Assessing Chinese Paranaul Behavior within the Nine-Dash Line,” in Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson (eds.),



*China's Maritime Gray Zone Operations* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019).  
Canvas.

- James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, "Deterring China in the "Gray Zone": Lessons of the South China Sea for U.S. Alliances," *Orbis* Vol. 61, No. 3 (2017), pp. 322-339.

*For further reading:*

- Thomas Schelling, "The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance," in Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 187-203.

October 13: First Strike Advantage and Emerging Technology

- Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Chapter 6 The Dynamics of Mutual Alarm, pp. 221-251.
- Adam N. Stulberg and Lawrence Rubin, "Introduction," in Adam N. Stulberg and Lawrence Rubin (eds.), *The End of Strategic Stability? Nuclear Weapons and the Challenge of Regional Rivalries* (Georgetown University Press, 2018), pp. 1-20.
- Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, "Thermonuclear Cyberwar," *Journal of Cybersecurity* Vol.3, No.1 (2017), pp. 37-48.
- Mariel John Borowitz, Lawrence Rubin, and Brian Stewart, "[National Security Implications of Emerging Satellite Technologies](#)," *Orbis* Vol. 64, No. 4 (2020), pp. 515-527.
- Jon R. Lindsay, "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction," *International Security* Vol. 39, No. 3 (2014/2015), pp. 7-47.

*For further reading:*

- Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace," *International Security* Vol. 41, No. 3 (2016/2017), pp. 44-71.
- Tong Zhao, "Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security Dilemma," in Adam N. Stulberg and Lawrence Rubin (eds.), *The End of Strategic Stability? Nuclear Weapons and the Challenge of Regional Rivalries* (Georgetown University Press, 2018), pp. 174-202.

October 20: War Termination

- H. E. Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*, Chapter 2: A Theory of War Termination, pp. 19-52.
- Suzanne Werner, "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 42, No. 3 (1998), pp. 321-43.
- Elizabeth A. Stanley, "Ending the Korean War: The Role of Domestic Coalition Shifts in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace," *International Security* Vol. 34, No. 1 (2009), pp. 42-82.

- Thomas Christensen, *Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia* (Princeton University Press, 2011), Chapter 4 pp. 109-122.

*Discussion: Ending the Ukraine War*

- Samuel Charap, "An Unwinnable War: Washington Needs an Endgame in Ukraine," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 102, No. 4 (July/August 2023).
- Carter Malkasian, "The Korea Model: Why an Armistice Offers the Best Hope for Peace in Ukraine," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 102, No. 4 (July/August 2023).

October 27: Rational Explanation for War--Private Information and the Commitment Problem

- James Fearon, "Rational Explanation for War," *International Organization* Vol. 49, No. 3 (1995), pp. 379-414.
- Robert Powell, "War as a Commitment Problem," *International Organization* Vol. 60, No. 1 (2006), pp. 169-204.
- Anne E. Sartori, "The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes," *International Organization* Vol. 56, No. 1 (2002), pp. 121-149.
- Dalton Lin, "['One China' and the Cross-Taiwan Strait Commitment Problem](#)," *The China Quarterly* Vol. 252, pp. 1094-1116.

November 3: Domestic Politics and War

- James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audience and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 88, No. 3 (1994), pp. 577-592.
- Jessica L. Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 106, No. 2: 326-347.
- Jack Levy, "Preventive War and Democratic Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 52, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1-24.
- Jessica Chen Weiss, "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China," *International Organization* Vol. 67, No. 1 (2013), pp. 1-35.

*For further reading:*

- Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), Chapter 2.

November 10: In-class Simulation Planning and Policy Memo Nitty-Gritty

- Guest speaker: Chris McDermott
- M. Taylor Fravel and Charles L. Glaser, "How Much Risk Should the United States Run in the South China Sea?" *International Security* Vol. 47, No. 2 (Fall 2022), pp. 88-134.

November 17: In-class Simulation

November 24: No Class—Thanksgiving

December 1: In-class Simulation

**Policy Memos due on Friday, December 8 at 11:59 pm**