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Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense Systems in South Korea

Background

Top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi visited South Korea to ease diplomatic relations between the two nations on December 4, 2019, making his first appearance in the nation in over five years since a rift over the United States' deployment of Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) systems (Shin). After a 2017 launch of four ballistic missiles by North Korea, the United States began to deploy the THAAD anti-missile systems in South Korea due to the close proximity of heavily-populated Seoul, to North Korea's launch radius of now 5,500 kilometers (Wall). China took issue with such deployment, citing concerns that THAAD's radar technology would enable the U.S. to spy on China, and began unofficially sanctioning South Korea due to their agreement to host the systems (Volodzko). These sanctions amassed a \$15.6 billion loss for South Korea in 2017, the year of deployment. Major Korean industries such as Hyundai and Lotte, a supermarket chain, saw the highest losses, with Lotte facing a 95% sales drop in China. In reaching a détente between South Korea and China, South Korea agreed to not deploy future anti-missile systems, not join any region-wide missile defense system led by the U.S., and to not join any military alliance involving the U.S. and Japan (Volodzko). Furthermore, South Korea's disagreements extend beyond merely China and North Korea; South Korea and the U.S. struggled under the Trump administration to successfully renew the cost-sharing agreement beyond temporary solutions. (Denyer).

South Korea's concerns in the dispute over the presence of THAAD stem primarily from economic and military conflict standpoints. The Chinese sanctions of South Korean exports extend beyond the automobile and supermarket industries. The recent progress by South Korea to develop an appealing culture for global economic consumption experienced difficulty amid the conflict with China, as South Korea's tourism, cosmetics, and entertainment industries saw major losses (Shin). Due to the regional proximity and the high demand of Korean products in the nation, a drop in Chinese consumption of Korean goods causes significant harm to the country – especially in the tourism sector, where visitors from China make up half the annual tourists to South Korea. The only Korean industry immune to Chinese boycotts appears to be the electronics industry – one China considers too essential to its own prosperity to decrease trade (Mullen). Economic concerns in South Korea prove especially pressing given the nation's historic rise from the rubble of the Korean War over the past 66 years, wherein the nation's GDP per capita, which once fell short of \$100, now approaches \$30,000 (Oh). Consequently, economic rifts with China spark particular concern, which results in concrete actions from Korean government leaders. One of President Moon Jae-in's first steps in office involved the freezing of future THAAD deployment with the goal of easing tensions with China (Mullen).

South Korea's more existential concern in THAAD deployment involves the possibility of nuclear conflict with North Korea. The initial move to deploy THAAD stems from concerns over the growing capabilities of North Korean weapons. Concerns over the weapons capability of South Korea's northern neighbor are not to be understated; Japan regards Pyongyang as a "serious and imminent threat" to its regional neighbors (Sanger). North Korea tested intercontinental ballistic missiles sixteen times since February 2017, with the nation's missile

capabilities improving each time, posing a continually increasing threat to populations within a 5,500-kilometer range of the missiles.

Concerns over North Korean aggression extend beyond nuclear capabilities to recent actions believed to precede major policy shifts in North Korea, possibly in the direction of military actions against South Korea. At the beginning of December 2019, North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un, rode a white horse to the nation's sacred, snowy White Paektu. While appearing similar to traditional North Korean propaganda photoshoots of the esteemed leader, a visit to this holy site in particular historically precedes major policy shifts by the Kim regime; the last such trip by Kim Jong-un was followed by the successful launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile and a public declaration of North Korea as a nuclear power by its leadership. An expert on North Korea at Seoul's Kyungnam University notes that this visit indicates a desertion of hopes to negotiate peacefully with the United States and that South Korea "will see an escalation of tensions" from the North (Sang-Hun). Military leaders accompanied Kim Jong-un on the trip and the chief of staff of the People's Army noted "the use of armed forces is not the privilege of the U.S. only." North Korean capabilities and willingness to attack South Korea exist at an all-time high following increased weapons technology development and recent propagandistic shows of military resolve. South Korean concerns over conflict increase as the nation is the most likely recipient of potential North Korean aggression.

South Korean leadership faces further concerns over its relationship with the United States. After four years of increased tensions under the Trump administration's call for South Korea to increase its economic contribution to the military alliance from \$923 million to \$5 billion, Korean-American relations see potential for improvement under the Biden administration (Lee). The Biden administration quickly cooled tensions by agreeing to a 13.9 percent increase in

South Korea's contributions to joint military exercises (Burns). Despite the similar ideologies of the liberal leaders in the U.S. and South Korea, the struggle for South Korea to balance its economic dependence on China with its military reliance on the U.S. poses a continual problem for the nation (Shin).

Thesis

To defend against potential attacks from North Korea, South Korea requires a robust anti-missile defense system. Navigating the cost-sharing agreement for Presidents Biden and Moon following heightened tensions under the Trump administration raises questions over how cost-sharing agreements should continue in the long-term to prevent against constant arguments stemming from the personal attitudes of any given U.S. administration. For long-term stability of military agreements, the U.S. should look to its history of success with both South Korea and Japan in managing cost-sharing agreements based on a gradual increase of partner contributions.

Argument 1 - Necessity of Systems

Deployment of THAAD systems were necessary to defend South Korea from North Korean attacks and to counterbalance against the Chinese and North Korean partnership. South Korea no longer considers North Korea an enemy, though tensions remain over concerns of military action by North Korea alongside a shared national desire for reunification (Kim). Current relations between the two nations stem from the open conflict in the Korean War and subsequent designation of the 38th parallel as a demilitarized zone. The South Korean Defense Ministry identifies North Korean weapons as “threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.” North Korean missile testing serves as the trigger for THAAD presence in South Korea and the cause of the overall controversy. While the majority of anti-THAAD public statements come from North Korea's primary ally, China, North Korea itself condemns

deployment of the systems as an act of aggression. North Korean actions against THAAD take the form of a series of weapons tests beginning just one day after the public announcement of THAAD deployment (Isaksson). Despite these negative responses, South Korea in January 2019 declared North Korea to not be an enemy for the first time since 2010. Symbolic summits between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un indicate a willingness toward cooperation between the nations. Another promising sign for relations is that older generations of South Koreans view cooperation with North Korea as more positive than younger generations due to differences over views on reunification (Shim). The presence of about 32,000 North Korean defectors in South Korea indicates a hopeful eventual unity between the two countries but cannot distract from the military threat posed by North Korea that guides South Korean leadership on decisions regarding THAAD.

South Korea and the United States share close economic and military ties that led to the deployment of THAAD on the peninsula. However recent tensions spurred by the Trump administration's demands of South Korea on issues of economic support complicate the issue of further THAAD deployment and continued maintenance of the systems by U.S. troops. South Korea and the U.S. view THAAD as a necessary defensive measure against North Korean aggression, continuing the initial deployment despite objections from China and South Korea's own concerns about the negative environmental impact of the anti-missile system. South Korea "considered THAAD to be one means of filling security gaps and securing conditions for the stable presence of US forces," indicating both a support of THAAD beyond basic defensive interests and instead indicating a desire to use THAAD as a means of further tightening the U.S.-South Korea alliance (Serbin). This desire by both nations to remain close allies underwent significant strain with the previously mentioned demands by the Trump administration for South

Korea to support its economic contributions to the alliance – a proposed 500 percent increase of current support, contrasted with 2019’s increase of only eight percent (Lee, B.J.). Such proposals cause further strain as critics in Seoul believe the demands to come from a place not of economic concern but rather for the leveraging of NATO budgeting, a strategy some critics label a “bullying” of Seoul (Lee, B.J.). The United States supports a continued THAAD presence in South Korea as it increases the nation’s military dominance in East Asia: the maintenance of bases in both South Korea and Japan promote the democracies and free markets of liberal allies in a region surrounded by authoritarian and communist governments that contradict an American view of a liberal world order.

South Korea worked with the United States on deploying THAAD over a several month period, which was put on temporary hold due to environmental concerns but eventually completed rapidly following North Korea’s most powerful nuclear test. The deployment involves radar six interceptor-missile launchers that fire a missile aimed at the incoming missile to destroy it in the air before reaching land and causing catastrophic harm to citizens (Sang-Hun). The deployment of THAAD directly fulfills South Korea’s short-term goal of protection against potential attacks by North Korea and reaffirms the nation’s commitment to its ties with the United States. Notably, THAAD works. THAAD operates with high power and precision in its ability to destroy short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (Woolf). Those defensive measures effectively counter the current military capabilities of North Korea and creates an anti-missile bubble around THAAD that protects South Korea. The increased military investment by the United States further pursues South Korea’s goal of deterrence against North Korea – especially pertinent given the South Korean army’s smaller size compared to that of North Korea. United States’ support on the peninsula achieves a level of military might that

South Korea lacks the capability to achieve, even with the nation's compulsory military draft. THAAD maintains U.S. support on the peninsula despite recent complications to the relationship, as the significant investment by the U.S. in the maintenance of such technologies tightens the military alliance, whereas, as noted by Scott Snyder of *Forbes*, a removal or halting of THAAD deployment "could do great damage to the U.S.-ROK security alliance." A maintenance of this relationship proves essential, as it maintains the authority of the South Korean-U.S. mutual defense clause which triggers immediate military retaliation by the two nations in the event of a North Korean attack, effectively ensuring the short-term safety of South Korea (Auslin).

Deployment of THAAD came with tradeoffs for long-term peace on the peninsula as well as economic relations with China, both of which require extensive diplomatic talks to realign South Korea toward fulfillment of these goals. In the instance of China, the return to normal economic trade required post-THAAD deployment military concessions, notably involving an agreement to not deploy future anti-missile systems. For goals of peace, THAAD severely undermined steps toward a non-violent unification of the two nations as North Korea responded to THAAD deployment with an immediate closing of a diplomatic channel with the United States, which mediates between North Korea and South Korea as well as advocates for denuclearization and unification (Rosen). These diplomatic losses negatively impact the future of unification drastically. William Hartung of *The Hill* notes, "Diplomacy is the only approach that has a chance of making a difference" due to the potential devastation of open military engagement and the need for non-violence for an effective, long-term reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The extent of THAAD's degradation of the feasibility of unification is still unknown

and will likely become clear following North Korea's anticipated announcement following Kim Jong-un's recent propaganda visit to Mount Paektu.

South Korea lacked a better option than THAAD deployment. While the anti-missile systems harmed South Korea's relations with China and North Korea, the U.S. suggestion of deployment placed South Korea in a strategic corner. As previously noted, a refusal to deploy THAAD would severely harm the increasingly rocky South Korean-U.S. relationship that maintains the wary peace between South Korea and North Korea. Further, a refusal of THAAD by South Korea makes dangerous concessions to China: *Foreign Affairs* notes that allowing China to block THAAD would "set a dangerous precedent, emboldening Chinese policymakers to expand their use of economic leverage as a coercive tool" (Glaser). South Korea's acceptance of Chinese sanctions as a necessary byproduct of maintaining their military alliance with the U.S. prevents further growth of China as a hegemon and ensures stability of the region. The counterbalancing influences of China over North Korea and the U.S. over South Korea fall at the crux of the wary peace on the peninsula and a removal of U.S. involvement would leave South Korea with a worse hand in negotiations toward peace. Consequently, while THAAD's long-term impact on Korean unification appears negative, a refusal of THAAD deployment could have triggered a destabilization of the region by granting China greater authority over the region and subsequent diplomacy that favors the Kim regime. Such concessions would signify a principle concession to the authoritarian, anti-capitalistic governments of North Korea and China, undermining the liberal world order in the region.

Argument 2 - Cost-Sharing Agreement

Domestically, the U.S. disagrees on how to manage cost-sharing agreements with other countries. While some argue that U.S. partner nations should pay a premium for the U.S. military

presence abroad, this approach undermines U.S. dedication to peace and stability and harms alliances. Gradual increases of partner contributions allow for long-term stability of alliances and advance U.S. foreign policy interests. The U.S. and South Korea must settle upon a long-term cost-sharing plan that adjusts based on the economic variants of the day. Without a long-term guide, cost-sharing agreements remain subject to often incorrect American attitudes toward cost-sharing. The final ratifier of cost-sharing agreements sits in the White House and the president's often overly-politicized attitudes toward defense cost-sharing agreements harm long-term stability of joint military operations (Bosack). These politicized arguments are not rooted in economic or military strategy, but rather a nationalistic attitude of "Cost plus 50," which seeks an "exorbitant increase" in allies' cost-sharing contributions, demanding they pay the full cost of hosting troops plus a 50% premium (Bloomberg). These cost-sharing disputes result in temporary, patchwork cost-sharing agreements that last one year or less and only seek to prevent a freeze in joint operations (Bosack).

These cost-sharing agreements are held together by mutual necessity. While political leaders often politicize costs, the negotiations must end in a successful renewal of joint exercises. Pacific partnerships provide key mutual benefits that nearly guarantee their renewal, even if negotiations prove rocky. Japanese and Korean alliances allow the U.S. to consistently train and engage with partners during times of peace and provide posturing that allows rapid response to any attacks or other destabilizing efforts in the region (Harding). Brian Harding, senior expert on Southeast Asia at the United States Institute of Peace notes regarding recurring cost-sharing negotiations, "seeking to renegotiate them in pursuit of a "better deal," would send a terrible signal to U.S. allies, undermine national security, and throw doubt on the credibility of future negotiations." Consequently, the future of South Korean-U.S. cost-sharing agreements depends

heavily on the precedent set by previous negotiations between both the U.S. and Japan and South Korea.

The U.S.-Korea and U.S.-Japan cost-sharing agreements are similar for a number of reasons. First, they both seek to provide stability in the East Asian region by balancing U.S. forces against the concerning alliance between a hostile North Korea and the superpower China. Secondly, they both address the defense needs of nations whose militaries were significantly or totally wiped out by conflict and treaties during the 20th century. Finally, they both involve highly politicized cost-sharing agreements which are renegotiated on a basis of every five years, give or take a year depending on the previous agreement ([WSJ SK article](#)). As a result, two case studies are necessary to determine the best course of action regarding cost-sharing agreements in South Korea: one involving South Korea's own cost-sharing relationship with the U.S. and a second involving Japan's agreement with the U.S.

Cost-Sharing Case 1: South Korea

Joint exercises in South Korea originated sixteen months after the end of the Korean War. These exercises have continued steadily since then, with notable expansion of U.S. presence between 1976 and 1991, when the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) created the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command which created a permanent office of joint military exercises for the countries (Collins). Modern posturing agreements, "while far from perfect, are the result of years of difficult negotiations" (Harding). Traditionally, these cost-sharing agreements occur in private rooms between diplomats from each country (Stutte). However, the decision to bring these cost-sharing disputes into public life "has almost certainly doomed them," as South Korean polling puts opposition to increased contributions at 96% (Stutte).

Public questioning of the South Korean cost-sharing agreement hurts its long-term success. Rather than continuing to pay the steep cost of joint military exercises, the Trump Administration publicly suggested that South Korea develop their own nuclear technologies to defend themselves on the peninsula (NYTimes). The Trump Administration further diminished South Korea's historic contributions to the partnership, by ignoring that the largest joint military base in South Korea was 90% funded by South Korea, who footed the \$11 billion bill (Lee). For the long-term success of this military agreement, South Korea has frequently paid the majority of costs for base construction while the US contributes in other ways. Notably, the consequences of a public disregard for Korea's contributions harmed the relationship. While Korean support of the partnership remained at 92%, the attitude toward the US fell to a historic low of 45% (Friedhoff, Wike). This shift indicates that the questioning of cost-sharing agreements does not harm Korean dedication to the relationship itself due to the significant benefits of US military protection, however it does shift the relationship to primarily one of strategic benefit rather than a partnership between two liberal nations advancing democracy in a region threatened by North Korea and China. Effectively, the public questioning of the partnership sidelines support for its continuation to acceptance out of security necessity rather than shared cultural values.

Public questioning of U.S. dedication to the cost-sharing alliance proves destabilizing. RAND Corporation notes regarding the dangers of narrowly focusing on cost-sharing disagreements in military alliances "may yield implications about the distribution of burdens that are biased significantly" (RAND). The bias of these discussions in favor of more money from partner nations undermines multiple goals of strategic partnership. In the case of South Korea, the focus on cost-sharing ignores the promotion of liberal democracy in a country close to dictatorial North Korea and the increasingly authoritarian China. Notably, the focus on primarily

the cost-sharing agreements undermines the partnership goal of getting multiple nations on the same strategic page (RAND). In the case of the U.S. and South Korea, this issue expressed itself in the form of the Trump Administration's attempts at diplomacy with North Korea that "appeared uncoordinated" with South Korea and were completed without prior consultation of the partner state (Fuchs). These actions hampered South Korea's reunification goals as following the failure of the February 2019 Trump-Kim summit, North Korea destroyed the North-South liaison office (Berlinger). Despite these setbacks, the U.S.-South Korean cost-sharing relationship survived due to President Moon's dedication to the partnership in the rocky interim period of the Trump Administration.

During recent history's most unstable period of the U.S.-South Korea military alliance, it survived because of the quiet dedication of the Moon Administration. As Trump spoke loudly regarding his disapproval of the alliance, Moon quietly downplayed the issue and the Blue House negotiated the temporary one-year cost-sharing agreement in the absence of a long-term solution. Furthermore, Blue House publications regarding the issue refused to take a hard stance and insisted disagreements would lessen due to a growing "mutual understanding" between the U.S. and South Korea (송상호). South Korean support of the alliance continued even during the uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic, as the Moon administration sent millions of face masks and hundreds of thousands of COVID-19 tests to the U.S. (Bowden). Consequently, the cost-sharing agreement survived due to quiet dedication of South Korean leadership.

President Moon's dedication to the partnership paid off as the Biden administration entered office, indicating that cost-sharing agreements thrive through an absence of politicization and gradual increases in contributions. Following Moon's dedication to the partnership, the U.S. and South Korea successfully negotiated a 13% increase in Korean contributions in an agreement

that will last until 2025 (Lee). These cost-sharing increases occurred despite the aforementioned public disapproval of South Koreans to any cost increases. As these measures ensure for an additional five years of cost-sharing based on gradual increases, they point toward the long-term stability of cost-sharing agreements when they occur between state-appointed diplomats. Further, as the Biden administration noted, the agreement achieved meaningful increases while still demonstrating a U.S. dedication to stability on the Korean Peninsula, and this agreement indicates the necessity of cost-sharing negotiated in a way free from domestic politics and completed for the purpose of meeting the involved countries' foreign policy goals (Lee, WaPo).

Cost-Sharing Case 2: Japan

In the wake of World War II, the U.S. and Japan signed the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty which allowed U.S. forces to serve on the islands to provide defense measures that account for Japan's pacifist constitution (Maizland). In 1960 the relationship became more permanent with the establishment of U.S. bases in Japan. The alliance served primarily to defend Japan and counterbalance against Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean influence in East Asia. In recent years, the relationship focuses on missile defense with 2020 discussions circling around the deployment of Aegis Ashore, an anti-missile alternative to THAAD manufactured by the same company (Yamaguchi). Japan currently pays 40-50 percent of the total cost of joint military operations while the U.S., covering the remaining costs, contributes between \$1.7 and 2.1 billion each year (Maizland). The Trump administration pressured Japan to quadruple their contributions, demanding about \$8 billion per year from the ally (Mitchell). The demand was followed by a threat to withdraw the 12,000 U.S. troops should Japan not increase its payments. Through the U.S. and Japan alliance's long history, counterbalancing goals, and recently tenuous relationship under the Trump administration, the U.S.-Japan alliance proves highly similar to the

US-South Korea alliance and provides a viable case study for determining how cost-sharing agreements should best proceed.

The longevity of the U.S.-Japan cost-sharing relationship stems from gradual, inflation-based increases in Japanese contributions. Between 1971 and 1978, the exchange rate of United States Dollars (USD) to Japanese Yen (JPY) shifted from 360 yen to dollars to less than 200 yen to dollars (Bosack). This shift caused the cost of U.S. contributions to joint military exercise to rise sharply and necessitated an updated cost-sharing agreement to account for these changes. The development of the “Special Measures Agreement (SMA),” the joint military agreement that determines what costs each country provides. Notably, the SMA does not outline “overall stationing costs,” but rather addresses multiple subsets of station costs, specifically those that change significantly on a short-term basis due to varying economic conditions (Bosack). These economic changes necessitate the short-term nature of cost-sharing agreements. Cost-sharing agreements cannot be used to outline long-term cost-sharing because costs of utilities and labor change significantly year-to-year and could place an undue burden on the U.S. due to the changing exchange rates and labor costs in Japan (Bosack). The short-term nature of these cost-sharing agreements and their frequent renewal, while key to long-term fairness, may result in the politicization of cost-sharing agreements.

The Trump administration’s demands for rapid Japanese cost increases in the US-Japan cost-sharing agreement has decreased the popularity of the alliance among Japanese citizens and calls into question the US dedication to the alliance. Since Trump’s demands, the percent of Japanese citizens who believe the US “considers their interests not too much/not at all” raised by 12 points to 71 percent of Japanese citizens holding that view (Stokes). Brookings Institute notes “alliances are not valued in dollars and cents” and the Trump administration’s demands for

increased Japanese contributions threaten the long-term stability of the alliance (Klingner).

Conversely, the private discussion of the U.S.-Japan cost-sharing agreement led to its longevity.

The Diplomat notes regarding public discussions of cost-sharing agreements, “pressure from the public builds on the host nation to resist capitulation” to the U.S. demands for greater contributions (Stutte). However, when cost-sharing agreements occur behind closed doors between diplomats every five years, they successfully extend the relationship between the US and Japan (Stutte). Ultimately “gradual, incremental increases” lead to the long-term stability of the US-Japan alliance (Klingner).

Gradual increases in Japan’s contributions to the U.S.-Japan alliance succeed in the goal of long-term stability. Due to the short turnaround between Biden’s January inauguration and the expiration of the five-year cost-sharing agreement in March 2021, the Biden administration diplomats opted for a one-year agreement that maintains current levels of cost-sharing (Nikkei). This short-term agreement allows for robust, diplomatic negotiations of a deal that accounts for current economic conditions. Further, the temporary Biden administration agreement successfully extended the cost-sharing relationship where the Trump administration’s demands for a quadrupling of Japanese contributions failed. This temporary solution allows for the development of an agreement which allows for gradual increases of Japanese contribution even when Japanese views of the US are at a recent low.

Implications

THAAD successfully provides security to the Korean Peninsula, and the U.S. and South Korea were justified in their installation of the anti-missile systems. The capabilities of THAAD provide defense against North Korea’s current ballistic missile capabilities which proves especially essential as recent developments place Seoul within range of North Korean missile

capabilities. Furthermore, with Kim Jong-Un's Mount Paektu visit, North Korea demonstrated a clear willingness to engage in hostile activity. While THAAD resulted in significant Chinese sanctions against South Korea, resistance to those sanctions proved necessary. Halting installation of THAAD due to Chinese economic pressure would have sent a dangerous message to the Chinese government indicating that South Korea would bend to its economic will in a way that impacts their security measures. While in the short-term THAAD threatened reunification between North and South Korea, a halting of THAAD would have counterbalanced the region in China and North Korea's favor. As a result, any reunification efforts following the halting of THAAD installation would occur on Chinese-North Korean terms and threaten the success of liberal democracy and South Korean values in the region. Consequently, THAAD provides a key defense measure in U.S. anti-missile systems in East Asia to both protect South Korea and counterbalance against Chinese and North Korean influence in the region.

The most devastating blow to U.S.-South Korean relations in recent years came from the politicization of the cost-sharing agreement. As soon as Trump publicly demanded increased contributions following the nationalistic "Cost Plus 50" model, the negotiations' prospects grew significantly less likely. These public demands for more money called into question U.S. dedication to peace on the Korean Peninsula and resulted in measurable resistance from Korean citizens as 96% opposed increased contributions to the cost-sharing agreement. Current and future US politicians should avoid the use of "Cost Plus 50" in public speeches as it temporarily hurt the US-South Korea alliance and resulted in the temporary failure of the US to secure increased contributions from Japan in recent cost-sharing negotiations. When these discussions occur behind closed doors between trained diplomats, there exists steady, gradual increases of Korean contributions. The Japanese case study further shows how the politicization of

cost-sharing agreements threaten long-term stability of alliances and hamper U.S. popularity abroad. This politicization stretches across administrations, as the Biden administration settled for a one-year agreement with no significant increases in Japanese contributions due to the Trump administration's demands for exorbitant increases. With Japan, the greatest success comes from cost-sharing agreements that account for changing economic factors that allow both countries to renegotiate short-term agreements that do not place an undue burden on the United States. Following the example set by these case studies, the U.S.-ROK security alliance should renegotiate its cost-sharing agreement on a five-year basis that takes inflation into account and allows for gradual increases in South Korean contributions.

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